1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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MAIN COMMITTEE III

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3rd MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 25 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. RAMAKER (Netherlands)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

EXCHANGE OF VIEWS (continued)

1. Mr. ABDEL AZIZ (Egypt) said that the provisions of articles IV and V of the Treaty had been those least applied since the Treaty's entry into force. While, on the one hand, non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty complained of the restrictions to which they were subjected, particularly by the industrialized States, which prevented them from developing the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, on the other hand there were States which, without being parties to the Treaty, had obtained privileges and assistance that had enabled them to develop nuclear programmes not subject to the full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a practice which weakened the credibility of the Treaty.

2. Also, the activities of certain export control groups, consisting of a small number of States, contributed in some cases to the application of a double standard in the matter of exports, which restricted freedom of trade and the effectiveness of the appropriate international body contemplated in article V of the Treaty. Egypt therefore asked that the work of the control groups concerning the transfer of nuclear technology should be reviewed, so as to set up an international system requiring all the nuclear activities of any State to be subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards. In that matter there should be no discrimination between States that were parties and States that were not parties to the Treaty.

3. With regard to international technical cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, there were great shortcomings as a result of the continual drop in pledges for IAEA activities, which showed a lack of will on the part of States that were in a position to make contributions. Another question to be considered by the Conference was the optional nature of those contributions, which entailed no obligations. It was necessary to seek another formula that would combine the optional status of contributions with continuity at a level that would permit proper planning. Account needed to be taken of the increasing technological needs of the developing countries, which made it essential to have more reliable and sustainable resources for international cooperation.

4. With regard to the unconditional extension of the Treaty, which some considered essential to ensure international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Egypt believed that the manner in which article IV was applied, particularly with regard to States that were not parties to the Treaty and which enjoyed substantial privileges, justified the arguments against that type of extension. A formula should be found which would both strengthen the provisions of the non-proliferation regime, maintain the necessary balance between the legitimate interests of States parties, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States, and achieve universality for the Treaty through the accession of States which, without being parties to the Treaty, benefited from it.

5. Mr. HULSE (United Kingdom) said that it was to be hoped that the text agreed upon, although not issued, in 1990 could be taken as a starting-point for the work of the Committee, although it would need updating and streamlining.

The objective of the Conference was to review compliance with the Treaty and renew the framework for future compliance when the Treaty was extended. With regard to article IV of the Treaty, concerning the exchange and transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, he said that the United Kingdom had been at the forefront of research, production and the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. The main industrial organization in that field, the British Nuclear Industry Forum, had a membership of 70 corporations whose products were available on the international market. But article IV also covered technology transfers to Governments, and the United Kingdom considered that the IAEA should be the primary conduit for that type of transfer. Accordingly it channelled most of its contributions through the Agency. In addition to its contribution to the regular budget, in 1995 the United Kingdom had contributed over 5 per cent of the total Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund target; since 1985 it had committed up to $7.5 million in additional voluntary contributions to Fund footnote a/ projects. It had also made substantial in-kind contributions to scientific and academic activities. The United Kingdom urged all States to match its record. An issue of major concern was that many States made neither pledges nor payments to the Fund and even more remained significantly below their target figures. Since those figures were carefully adjusted to account for ability to pay, there were few reasons to justify contributions below target. Although the funds available for technical assistance and cooperation were significant, they fell far short of the target set. Therefore the first step towards securing the future development of the programme was for all States to make their contributions.

6. The final documents of the previous Review Conferences had urged preferential treatment for States parties in the disbursement of resources from the Fund. The United Kingdom supported that goal and targeted its footnote a/ contributions accordingly. Although the United Kingdom did not want to prevent technical assistance to non-parties, particularly in the area of safety, it would support an increase in the proportion of technical assistance and cooperation funds assigned to parties to the Treaty.

7. The United Kingdom welcomed the model project approach since it believed that that would lead to a more cost-effective technical cooperation programme with more funds spent on the transfer of technology and less on administration. Model projects which were closely linked to long-run national development goals would also be more relevant and sustainable. The Standing Advisory Group on Technical Assistance and Cooperation recently proposed by the Director General of IAEA should help to ensure that that was so.

8. There were, of course, some restrictions on the transfer of technology, apart from those imposed by the Treaty itself. The United Kingdom took the view that, in general, goods should be traded freely. But since almost all nuclear technology for civil uses could be used in ways which could also constitute a proliferation threat - and the intentions of some States gave cause for concern in that respect - nuclear technology had to be set in a framework which helped to prevent transfers that would constitute a breach of the obligations undertaken under article I and article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty. At the 1990 Conference the valuable work of the Zangger Committee had been acknowledged.

9. The Nuclear Suppliers Group had also been helpful in enabling supplying countries committed to non-proliferation to exchange information, clarify what needed to be controlled and assist each other in establishing effective controls which reduced the risks while leaving trade largely unaffected. The fact that some goods were controlled did not mean that they could never be exported, only that licences were required. In reality the impact on trade and technology transfer was minimal, since less than 6 per cent of total visible exports required licences and only about 1.5 per cent of licence applications were denied each year. Indeed, there were many greater constraints, particularly in the establishment of nuclear power programmes which had nothing to do with the export control regimes: cost, infrastructure, safety and environmental concerns, for example. The United Kingdom supported the nuclear energy elements of the technical cooperation programme and believed that IAEA could and should play a significant role in helping Member States to decide whether nuclear power was a sensible option, to determine the type of plant, to strengthen the necessary infrastructure, to establish waste-handling mechanisms and to ensure safety and radiation protection frameworks. But nuclear power must compete with other sources of energy and it only needed to be decided whether it was economically beneficial to and sustainable by the user.

10. Lastly, it was worth mentioning that, despite the practical difficulties, the record for the transfer of nuclear technology from the industrial countries to many recipients had been excellent. Since 1970, some $270 million had been spent on technical cooperation, with notable benefits of various kinds to the recipients. The United Kingdom remained committed to the full implementation of article IV and wanted nuclear trade and technology transfer to continue to flourish. Non-proliferation safeguards were key to that endeavour. Accordingly the indefinite extension of the Treaty was an essential prerequisite, since anything less would jeopardize the framework of cooperation built up over the past 25 years.

11. Mr. ROLAND (Belgium) said that the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty was vital to the establishment of lasting peace, without which international cooperation, exchange and trade could hardly flourish. It was also essential to the development of the civil nuclear industry and to energy and non-energy applications.

12. Belgium had signed scientific, industrial and technical cooperation agreements with a number of States, and with others it had entered into nuclear cooperation agreements. For some time it had been an active partner in international cooperation for the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and intended to continue it participation, especially for the benefit of developing countries. In the past decade Belgium had received more than 200 fellows from developing countries to whom it had provided training in various fields. With respect to energy applications, in addition to the training of technicians and administrators, cooperation covered the study of facilities, assistance with safety, planning aid and operational assistance.

13. In the non-energy sector, Belgium had made a valuable contribution to sustainable development in many countries and had helped to develop radioisotope application techniques for medical and industrial purposes, together with sterilization and food conservation techniques. It was contributing actively to

technical assistance in the area of nuclear safety, with special emphasis on the countries of central and eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Since 1991, Belgium had been providing ongoing assistance in the context of the PHARE and TACIS programmes of the European Union, with the active participation of Belgian agencies specialized in nuclear safety whose expertise was helpful in nuclear licensing procedures and nuclear engineering activities.

14. Within the framework of the IAEA Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund, Belgium had contributed actively to research for the eradication of sleeping sickness and had participated in a number of IAEA expert and assistance missions and in more than 40 industrial projects in many countries not members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Belgium wanted to continue to support any measure that would promote cooperation without the danger of proliferation. An important step in that direction would be to ensure that the largest possible number of States complied with universally recognized standards for the transfer of nuclear equipment and material. Belgium scrupulously observed those standards, whose goal was to encourage the fullest possible international exchange in the field of peaceful applications of nuclear energy and at the same time to attain non-proliferation objectives.

15. Belgium wished to highlight its decision to participate in international cooperation and the exchange of information on radioactive waste management. It was vital that every State should have the necessary financial and strategic means to manage safely the radioactive waste for which it was responsible, but that requirement should not represent an obstacle to regional and international cooperation. That important step would facilitate the access of a large number of States to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Lastly, Belgium reaffirmed its support for the cause of nuclear non-proliferation and one of its corollaries, namely, technical cooperation in the nuclear sector, as established by article IV of the Treaty.

16. Mr. OSTROWSKY (Poland) said that, in Poland's view, the principles of furthering development in peaceful applications of nuclear energy under article IV of the Treaty responded to the needs of countries desiring to develop their nuclear industry. Although Poland was largely a recipient of cooperation and assistance activities, it tried to render assistance to other countries within its possibilities.

17. The framework and structure provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had been and remained the decisive factor for developing cooperation in the nuclear field. The IAEA secretariat was to be commended for its effectiveness and for furthering relevant programmes tailored to the needs of recipient member States. Eight major centres in Poland were developing peaceful nuclear technologies. Those centres also took part in international exchange and cooperation. A review of Poland's assistance in the spirit of article IV revealed cooperation activities during the period 1990-1995 with over 50 countries, the majority of them developing. That focus on developing countries reflected a clear political will and the availability of relevant programmes in Polish laboratories. Scientists and experts from developed countries also had participated in training or seminars organized and supported by Polish institutions. Assistance activities had focused on training,

expertise, technology transfer, equipment transfer, research material and other services.

18. Poland had also received fellows, mostly through IAEA, which had provided funds for fellowships, while Polish institutes had provided research facilities and scientific guidance. Equipment deliveries were usually effected within the framework of IAEA contracts. In the absence of a nuclear energy programme for electricity generation in Poland, cooperation activities consisted of industrial isotope applications, radiological protection and environmental monitoring, and biotechnology and genetics. In the field of nuclear energy as applied to power generation, however, there had been some studies of the use of computer analysis and the development of codes. Polish experts had participated in evaluations of the nuclear safety of some installations carried out under the auspices of IAEA.

19. Mr. PARFAIT (France) said that his country's broad experience in the nuclear field was in three main sectors: nuclear energy; basic research in such areas as agriculture, food, environmental protection, medicine and waste management; and safety and radiation protection. It therefore had a special responsibility in international cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Aware of the importance of technology transfer to the success of development strategies, it was endeavouring to respond, to the extent possible, to requests for cooperation in the civil nuclear field, especially when received from developing countries parties to the Treaty. In that regard, it had adopted an active participation policy in the cooperation programmes of the international organizations concerned (principally IAEA) and had carried out cooperation programmes at the national level.

20. France provided a large share (7 per cent) of the resources of the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund of IAEA, which was funded by voluntary contributions from member States. In 1994, it had provided 25 per cent of the contributions of the European Union to the budget of the Fund. In 1995, it would further increase its participation, which had increased by more than 20 per cent in the past five years. It had also steadily increased its extrabudgetary contributions since 1990. At the national level, France had concluded 23 intergovernmental nuclear cooperation agreements, two thirds of them with developing countries. It had also signed technical agreements in that area with more than 20 developing countries which were parties to the Treaty. The implementation of article IV of the Treaty thus covered research and development agreements, preliminary studies for the installation of nuclear power stations, the supply of reactors for research and the generation of electricity, nuclear-waste management, the environment, nuclear safety, radiation protection, and the medical, agricultural, food, industrial or environmental applications of atomic energy. The agreements relating to research and investigation included the granting of study fellowships, the organization of visits of experts, the exchange of information and the transfer of software. France participated actively in nuclear safety cooperation programmes financed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European Union and had been one of the promoters of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which had been adopted in Vienna on 17 June 1994.

21. It was clear that international cooperation should be carried out in accordance with the obligations deriving from the Treaty, in particular

article I and article III, paragraph 2. It was important to reconcile the legitimate use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the need for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. To attain that objective, international controls were planned. The establishment of strict international controls was of enormous importance to France since the vital interests of all States, both North and South, were at stake. That did not mean that new limitations should be imposed, especially on the developing countries. On the contrary, it was a question of responding to their needs in terms of safety and development. France wished to see the Treaty extended indefinitely since that was the only way to create the climate of confidence necessary to pursue cooperation in the service of peace and development.

22. Mr. JUSUF (Indonesia), commenting on the implementation of article IV of the Treaty, said that his country had already embarked on the use of nuclear energy and was very appreciative of the cooperation and assistance provided by IAEA well before the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty in 1970. Indonesia had also benefited greatly from cooperation and exchange of information with various industrialized countries and with developing countries. During the first 25 years of Indonesia's Long-term Development Plan, initiated in 1969, the National Atomic Energy Agency (BATAN) had devoted great attention to the nuclear programme, which had contributed to the development of agriculture, public health and industry.

23. With regard to technical cooperation, particular mention should be made of the very efficient Regional Cooperative Agreement for the Asia and Pacific region. Parallel to those regional agreements, efforts were being made to intensify cooperation with the Northern Hemisphere, as well as between countries of the South, in the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. Consequently, his delegation was very keen to enhance such cooperation with other States parties to the Treaty. Indonesia appreciated the assistance and support of those nations which had helped it to develop and bring into operation the Serpong complex for nuclear research and development, and it was ready to share the utilization of those and other facilities with other States. In all those activities, particular importance was attached to the safety aspect and, in that connection, it should be pointed out that Indonesia had signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety in 1994 and had taken progressive steps towards the establishment of an independent national regulatory agency.

24. Despite the positive developments in Indonesia's nuclear programme, there had been other, less favourable, circumstances concerning the acquisition of technical know-how in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology. Indonesia had always stressed the necessity of ensuring the availability of resources so that the various national programmes could be pursued continuously and without interruption. However, the zero growth budget policy adopted by many international organizations, such as IAEA, had resulted in the rejection or postponement of various proposed projects. Although the annual target for voluntary contributions to fund IAEA technical assistance projects had been increasing slightly, his Government was concerned that many countries had not made pledges of voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund. It appeared that that matter would remain a topic for discussion by the Board of Governors of IAEA. Indonesia supported the remarks made by the Director General of IAEA on the question and fully agreed

that much more could be done if greater resources were available. Another matter of concern to his Government was the existence of export control regimes; they should be replaced by multilateral agreements, which were more acceptable to recipient countries. Such agreements would enable countries embarking on long-term nuclear programmes for peaceful purposes to consult interested supplier countries with regard to their economic development needs. His delegation welcomed the idea put forward by the Austrian delegation that the question should be considered in a special forum. It was also pleased to announce that a non-governmental organization, the Indonesian Nuclear Society (HIMNI) had recently been established with a view to supporting and promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Indonesia.

25. In conclusion, it could be stated that article IV of the Treaty had been implemented satisfactorily for a number of countries, while others had not benefited sufficiently from international cooperation to implement their programmes in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. A number of the issues which had been mentioned required greater compliance on the part of supplier States parties with their obligations.

26. Mr. OTHMAN (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his country had been one of the first to sign the non-proliferation Treaty. It had also resolutely complied with the comprehensive safeguards agreements established by the Treaty. The IAEA safeguards regime adequately fulfilled the purposes for which it had been created and the decision of a State to acquire nuclear technological know-how did not necessarily mean that it would seek to use such technology for non-peaceful purposes. If it was generally accepted, that interpretation would help to widen still further the gap between the nuclear-weapon and the non-nuclear-weapon countries with regard to know-how about the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the utilization of nuclear materials and radioisotopes.

27. The Syrian Arab Republic participated actively in the various activities of IAEA and every year sponsored training seminars organized by IAEA at the regional level. It also benefited from the IAEA programme of technical assistance for developing countries. In that connection, it hoped that the volume of that assistance would increase so that it could improve its capacity in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The Syrian Arab Republic continued to support the activities of IAEA relating to the safeguards regime and the control of nuclear materials. IAEA played a very effective role in providing assistance to experts in the developing countries and offered training not only in nuclear energy but also in nuclear safety, radiation protection and the various peaceful uses of radioisotopes.

28. The new restrictions which might be imposed on the exchange of nuclear technology and radioactive materials between States would prevent the developing countries from acquiring the knowledge, materials and installations necessary for scientific research. Those restrictions would contradict the provisions of article IV.2 of the Treaty which called upon all the States parties to facilitate the exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information necessary for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Such restrictions should be confined to technologies directly and specifically related to the production of nuclear weapons. They should not include dual-use equipment and materials because it was not so easy to use them for military purposes. It was

wrong to prevent certain States of the Middle East from acquiring nuclear equipment and knowledge resulting from research into the peaceful uses of nuclear energy or to prevent the utilization of powerful reactors, if the other States of the region were allowed to do so. It was unacceptable to apply a double standard to the region. It was hard to understand how Israel was allowed to acquire advanced nuclear technology and to be able to export it while the other States of the region were forbidden to acquire equipment and materials to carry out research in the fields of medicine, agriculture and science. Syria had signed the Convention on the early notification of nuclear accidents and the International Convention on Nuclear Safety and at an appropriate time would sign the agreement on radioactive wastes.

29. The delegation of Syria reiterated that the Treaty's success would depend on the achievement of broad nuclear disarmament and the total cessation of nuclear tests in all forms. It also depended on the universality of the Treaty. To that end, from the rostrum of the United Nations, Syria called upon Israel to adhere to the NPT and submit to IAEA inspections so that all the countries of the region could accept the extension of the Treaty. The attainment of that objective would create a climate of greater confidence in the region and hence would strengthen peace and security.

30. Mr. DE LA TORRE (Argentina) pointed out that the Treaty provisions under consideration by the Committee referred to the inalienable right of all the parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II. The interpretation given to those provisions would influence the attitude of delegations: on the one hand, a competitive and contradictory interpretation would give rise, under the prohibitions in articles I and II, to the possibility that the countries possessing nuclear technology would use it in a discriminatory manner in order to withhold nuclear cooperation from certain States, contrary to the provisions of article IV; on the other hand, if those provisions were considered to be complementary, the Treaty would be considered as an international instrument allowing nuclear cooperation by providing sufficient guarantees on the peaceful nature of those activities. The difficulty of those two interpretations arose from doubts about the good faith shown in the application of the Treaty provisions by those who, in violation of it, tried to engage in activities prohibited by the Treaty and by those, under pretext of those provisions, arbitrarily withheld technical cooperation. Argentina considered that transparency and confidence were the only solutions to that dilemma.

31. It must be recognized that confidence in the safeguards system had been affected by violations of the Treaty by two of the parties; hence the attempt to restore that confidence with a safeguards system strengthened by improved transparency. Argentina supported those efforts and its present policy was based on its own experience: in the past, the failure to accept the main international instruments on non-proliferation, such as NPT, had meant that Argentina had become increasingly isolated from the technological viewpoint so that at the beginning of the 1990s there was no nuclear cooperation agreement between Argentina and the most advanced nuclear countries. In fact, such isolation brought with it backwardness and backwardness led to poverty and underdevelopment. In order to break that vicious circle, Argentina opted for transparency, by adhering to all the international instruments in the field,

including the present Treaty. The change in policy allowed renewed links of cooperation with the technologically most advanced countries. For example, Argentina had concluded important international instruments from 1992 onwards with France, Canada, the United States and Germany. Argentina was also conducting negotiations with the European Atomic Energy Commission (EURATOM) and with the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of OECD and with Japan. At the same time, he wished to mention the signing of a memorandum of understanding with the United States on the transfer of strategic technology (1993) and the elimination of the provisions which restricted nuclear trade with Argentina. Such cooperation was also extended to other fields with many other European countries, such as Germany, Italy and Spain. He also drew attention to the agreement between the national space agencies of the United States and Argentina for cooperation in the civil use of outer space (1991) and the memorandum of understanding between those two agencies for the preparation of the first Argentina satellite, SAC B, which would be launched in 1995. During that process, Argentina was admitted to the Australian Group (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, groups with which Argentina shared the objectives of non-proliferation included in articles I and II of the Treaty.

32. Argentina, which fully supported the objectives of horizontal non-proliferation and cooperated freely with the most advanced countries in the field of nuclear technology, possessed the oldest nuclear programme in Latin America and was engaged in a vast range of cooperation in that field. At the moment, 15 per cent of its energy production came from nuclear sources; 87.6 per cent of the work on the third nuclear power station had been completed; and in 1994 heavy water production had begun, up to 99.89 per cent in the Arroyito plant, which had a production capacity of 250 tons a year. Cooperation with IAEA included scholarships, scientific visits, participation in technical meetings, technical cooperation projects covering several years of basic and applied research, supply of equipment, etc. Current projects included uranium exploration, studies of the factors limiting the useful life of nuclear power stations and medical, industrial and agricultural applications. Argentina had participated from the beginning, in the early 1980s, in the broadest nuclear cooperation programme of the region, the Regional Cooperation Agreements for the Promotion of Science and Technology in Latin America (ARCAL). In 1994, in the publications of IAEA, Argentina appeared as the fifth largest donor in the matter of experts.

33. Finally, he repeated the statement made by the Argentine delegation at the inauguration of the first seminar on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-proliferation, organized by Argentina, together with Brazil and the United States, in Bariloche in 1994. He considered that the statement was still valid and summed up Argentine experience in the nuclear field: "Access to advanced technology is essential for the modernization of the country and undoubtedly requires international cooperation. The possibilities of cooperating with the most advanced countries increased in direct proportion to the degree of active commitment to non-proliferation. This is logical because the weapons of mass destruction constitute a specific and serious threat to the survival of humanity."

34. Mr. TYU (Ukraine) recalled that 26 April was the ninth anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster whose aftermath had remained with Ukraine for a long time. He informed the Committee of the measures adopted in Ukraine to strengthen security and to solve the problems of dismantling that installation. Ukraine understood the anxiety of the international community at the continued operation of the Chernobyl plant. The President of Ukraine had announced that the plant would close at the latest in the year 2000 and had given the assurance that Ukraine was doing its utmost to accelerate that process, bearing in mind how important it was to guarantee security at each stage of dismantling. With that objective, between 1986 and 1994, Ukraine had adopted numerous measures to modernize the installation, a move which had considerably strengthened its safety.

35. It should not be forgotten that Ukraine was currently carrying out far-reaching social, political and economic transformations, the system of production had been disrupted, and the country was facing an energy crisis. Consequently, Ukraine was not in a position to dismantle immediately and on its own the Chernobyl power station, since it had to create alternative sources of energy which would produce the equivalent power. At the same time, it was necessary to resolve a whole series of complex scientific and technical problems: it would have to strengthen the security of the "tomb" of the fourth reactor of the power plant without overlooking the means of protecting the environment; provide scientific and technical support for dismantling the power plant, especially if account was taken of the exceptional conditions prevailing in the Chernobyl exclusion zone; construct storage facilities for the fuel used and for the radioactive and other waste; and tackle the complex social problems arising from the closure of the power plant. It was estimated that the closure would cost Ukraine more than $4 billion, and such a colossal programme could never be implemented without the technical, scientific and financial support of the international community.

36. One of the most important tasks facing the Committee was the review of the implementation of the articles of the Treaty, especially article IV. In that regard, he said that cooperation for the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was constantly being expanded, overcoming - not without difficulty - selfish national interests and, at times, the mercenary interests of certain donor countries. The world was becoming increasingly aware that stable development and progress hinged upon broad cooperation among equals. Those ideas were congruent with the objective information contained in the excellent documents of the IAEA secretariat. In that regard, Ukraine proposed that efforts should be centred on the creation of effective machinery aimed at strengthening cooperation among the States parties to the Treaty, increasing nuclear security, promoting the transfer of technology and the exchange of information on nuclear energy and the fuel cycle, and locating the technical and financial resources needed to achieve those tasks. With a view to creating a climate of confidence among suppliers and recipients, his delegation proposed the periodic publication of all statistical information relating to the granting of licences to countries which were not parties to the Treaty. In addition, periodic consultations should be held between the nuclear suppliers and recipient countries in order to consider export systems in general.

37. Ms. BEŠKER (Croatia) said that the Director General of IAEA had addressed two of the most important questions pertinent to the review and extension of the Treaty: (a) the possibility of eventually eliminating the threat of nuclear weapons and attaining international stability, and (b) the possibility of harnessing the tremendous force of the atom as a sustainable, environmentally benign source of energy for constructive purposes, and he had suggested that both those objectives were attainable. Croatia also subscribed to that view, but she wanted to emphasize that the elements of the Treaty were conditional on one another and that only in their mutuality could they underpin and reinforce the system and operation of the Treaty. Therefore, only the full cooperation of all States in the attainment of that objective would render the Treaty relevant to world stability and to further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes for the benefit of all countries.

38. Commenting on Croatia's experience in the implementation of article IV of the Treaty and the activities of IAEA to facilitate the peaceful application of nuclear technology, she said that her country had joined the family of nations during the historic changes of the past few years. As was generally known, Croatia had been faced with enormous problems related to its territorial integrity and sovereignty, and to the half a million refugees displaced by the aggression and the war. Nevertheless, it had made every effort to fulfil its obligations as a non-nuclear-weapon State with a deep interest in strengthening the non-proliferation regime and a strong wish to cooperate fully with IAEA in the peaceful applications of atomic energy. Croatia had become party to the Treaty by virtue of succession in 1992. In June 1994, it had signed a comprehensive safeguards agreement which had taken effect on 29 January 1995. On 10 April 1995, it had signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which was expected to be ratified soon. Croatia was aware that the financial resources of IAEA had been fully stretched; it had therefore made an extraordinary effort to pay its arrears for 1992 and 1993, and also hoped to fulfil its pledge, despite its formidable economic and financial problems. In that context, her delegation acknowledged the performance of donor countries in facilitating access to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology by States parties to the Treaty through their voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund, their extrabudgetary contributions, and "assistance in kind". Croatia hoped that they would continue their financial support to IAEA as the world's principal forum for scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. She commended the continuing professionalism, dedication and skill of the IAEA secretariat and staff and their responsiveness to Croatia's needs and interests. She also commended the efforts and initiatives of IAEA to strengthen its main activities, particularly technical cooperation, through the development of effective programmes aimed at improving national scientific and technological capabilities, especially of developing countries and countries in transition, in the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

39. Croatia had embarked on a new biennial cycle of technical cooperation with IAEA whose main objectives for 1995 and 1996 were: upgrading nuclear analytical services for environmental and health studies, and applications in industry; developing nuclear methods of modification and analysis of materials; modernizing infrastructure and improving the preparedness of technical staff of national regulatory and inspection bodies in the field of nuclear safety,

radiation protection and radioactive-waste management; and strengthening radiation applications in medicine.

40. Croatia had also benefited from the participation of its scientists and specialists in IAEA conferences and seminars, and had in turn contributed to IAEA activities in that field. Croatia strongly supported IAEA regional and interregional technical cooperation activities and projects. Its future technical cooperation with IAEA would continue to focus on the need to address the interest in and concern about nuclear energy, the strengthening of the radiation-protection and nuclear-safety infrastructure, radioactive-waste management, and the upgrading of radiotherapy methods and facilities in human health.

41. In closing, she expressed her delegation's strong support for the overall objectives formulated by IAEA for its medium-term activities in fulfilling the objectives of article IV of the Treaty. Croatia especially welcomed the decision of IAEA to ensure the compatibility of its technology-transfer activities with national development plans and goals, a decision which would strengthen the relevant national infrastructures. It would also induce the competent authorities and national infrastructures to focus their activities on priority areas of cooperation that would most benefit basic human needs and promote sustainable development. It also welcomed the readiness of IAEA to deal imaginatively with the challenges provoked by the diversity and complexity of nuclear technology in an "Agenda 21" world, and in the changed political and economic landscape in Central and Eastern Europe. In view of those factors, her delegation offered its strong support to the ongoing redirection of IAEA technical cooperation activities. It was convinced that they had substantially contributed and would contribute in the future to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the benefit of all countries.

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.